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Introduction
Financial indicators have been widely used in the business failure literature in order to predict the risk of failure1 of 
firms (Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Barnes, 1987; Aziz et al., 1988). The studies on business failure prediction are 
based on the original work of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). In contrast, financial ratios have been less commonly 
used in a more preventive perspective to failure (Van Wymeersch and Wolfs, 1996; Van Caillie, 2000; Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2006). Nevertheless, in a preventive perspective to small business failure, it is important to better understand 
how financial symptoms combine over time (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 1986) and to identify if relationships can be 
traced between the fundamental causes of failure and specific financial indicators. 
An interesting starting point for this last consideration would be the work of Crutzen (2009) and Crutzen and Van 
Caillie  (2009).  Indeed,  based  on  unique  information  about  the  failure  origins  of  a  sample  of  203  small  Belgian 
distressed  firms2, this research stresses five major explanatory failure patterns amongst small firms (EBFPs). These 
patterns are presented in Table 1 :
EBFP 1 Shocked firms
EBFP 2 Firms serving other interests
EBFP 3 Apathetic firms
EBFP 4 Firms that fail because of a punctual managerial error
EBFP 5 Badly-managed firms 5a - Firms with deficiencies in strategic management
5b - Totally badly-managed firms
5c - Firms with deficiencies in business administration
Table 1 : Five major EBFPs amongst small firms (Crutzen, 2009)
Referring to these original EBFPs, this paper tends to integrate the organizational and financial approaches of small 
business  failure.  This  paper  aims  at  determining  if  these  EBFPs  can  be  associated  with  some  specific  financial 
indicators and, if so, if small distressed firms can be associated to one particular EBFP on the basis of the financial 
information published in the annual accounts. If each EBFP leads to some specific financial symptoms, then it will be 
possible to get  a proxy information about the fundamental problems inducing failure without having any access to 
internal information, this identification being considered as a crucial step in the elaboration of any recovery or takeover 
plan (Argenti, 1976; Gaskill et al., 1993)3. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is not to help to detect distressed firms as early as possible (as in predictive 
studies) but is to help key actors to easily identify, on the basis of external financial information, from which patterns 
distressed firms are coming from and in particular, to determine the fundamental causes of their failure in order to 
1 Bankruptcy mainly
2 Firms investigated by the Court of Commerce of Liège in the framework of a Commercial Inquiry, a Legal 
Reorganization or a Bankruptcy
3 Already in 1976, Argenti stated that “only corrective actions that would solve the fundamental causes of the 
difficulties would really lead to a lasting recovery of the firm”.
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implement the possible adequate corrective actions.
In order to reach this objective, the present paper is based on a deductive reasoning (Thiétart, 2003) : it tests a series of 
hypotheses which relates to the various patterns. These hypotheses are elaborated on the basis of the description of the 
patterns identified by Crutzen (2009) and on the basis of three underlying (financial) models : Beaver's cash flow model 
(1966), Ooghe and Van Wymeersch's financial failure path (1986) and Laitinen's financial failure processes (1991). 
The present study is based on the following basic assumptions.
Firstly, all failing firms do not behave the same way in terms of financial ratios once they enter the second step of the 
failure process, i.e. the distress phase. Different financial failure processes may thus be distinguished such as an acute or 
a chronic financial failure process (Laitinen, 1991). Nevertheless, in fine, the financial symptoms themselves seem to be 
relatively similar from one distressed firm to another (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 1986; Mone et al., 1998). It is rather 
the first symptoms (or early warning signals) and the speed at which the financial symptoms deteriorate that vary from 
one firm to another (D'Aveni, 1989a; Laitinen, 1991). 
Secondly, the choice of the five basic financial dimensions and of the ratios under consideration in the present study is 
made on a solid theoretical basis (Barnes, 1987; Karels and Prakash, 1987) : the models of Beaver (1966), of Ooghe and 
Van Wymeersch (1986, 2006) and of Laitinen (1991) are considered as a basis for the selection of the financial ratios. 
Actually, these researchers selected a limited amounts of financial ratios on the basis of a theoretical model as well as 
on the basis of an extensive review of pertinent ratios used in the previous literature on business failure.
Thirdly, all distressed firms from the sample are not at the same stage of the failure process when they are considered : 
some firms only show several failure symptoms (at a Commercial Inquiry) whereas other ones are already bankrupt. It 
is thus very difficult to compare the evolution of their financial situation in the year(s) preceding this moment. Indeed, it 
is reasonable to assume that the financial ratios generally deteriorate more rapidly in the years preceding the bankruptcy 
of the firm than in the years preceding a Commercial Inquiry (Marco, 1989).
Considering this point, the coherence in the sequential measurement of the financial ratios of the sampled firms is 
defined by the Signaling Approach (Spence,  1973),  which is  integrated into the framework of  the Agency Theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). According to these approaches, the managers, who are within the firm, 
dispose of a better information about the firm than outsiders do. Therefore, signals are sent outside (with or without the 
approval of the management) in order to inform the external world about the firm's situation : official communications, 
annual accounts, legal signals such as protests, etc. (D'Aveni, 1989).
With reference to these approaches, the present analysis includes, for all kinds of sampled firms4, the financial ratios 
that relate to the (seven) years before the first external signals are detected and considered as relevant and sufficiently 
intense by the Court, so that it regards each firm as a (detected) distressed firm5. Concretely, for each case, we identified 
the year in which, for the first time, failure signals emitted by the firm were so intense that the Court considered the 
4 Distressed firms convoked to a Commercial Inquiry, engaged into a Legal Reorganization or into a Bankruptcy 
procedure.
5 Indeed, in some cases, a file was open beforehand by the Court on the basis of the detection of relevant signals. 
Some firms were thus considered as “detected distressed firms” some months or years before a Commercial Inquiry 
was organized or before entering a Legal Reorganization or a Bankruptcy procedure.
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firm as in distress (N). Then, we collected, for each case, relevant financial information for the seven years before this 
moment. Finally, we tried to identify relationships between the EBFP to which the firm was related and (the evolution 
of) its financial ratios.
Fourthly, as N is determined on the basis of the system of the Court for detecting and analyzing external failure signals, 
this latter is considered as meaningful6 in the present study.
Fifthly, the macroeconomic environment has an homogeneous impact on the whole sample of small firms7 because all 
the firms are located in the same geographical area (the juridical area of Liège) and because all of them are small firms. 
Thus, we may assume that they do not exert any dominant influence on their market (or on the environment) (Delacroix 
and Swaminathan, 1991; Hall, 1994).
The paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the conceptual framework of the current study. The second 
section exposes the hypotheses that are tested in this paper. The methodology used to test the hypotheses is presented in 
the third section : the sample, the variables and the data analysis methods are clarified. Then, the results of the empirical 
analysis are outlined. Finally, the fifth section discusses these empirical results and summarizes the main findings of the 
study. 
1. Conceptual framework
The current study is based on a series of hypotheses which have been determined on the basis of three previous research 
: Beaver's cash flow model (1966), Ooghe and Van Wymeersch's financial failure path (1986) and Laitinen's financial 
failure processes (1991). 
An overview of these models is proposed below. 
1.1. Beaver's Cash Flow Model (1966)
Figure 1 : The Cash Flow Model (Beaver, 1966)
6 This means that we assume that this detection system is based on a clear and logical method which makes sense. 
Indeed, we cannot assume this system is totally efficient (i.e. detection of ALL distressed firms).
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In this model (Figure 1), the firm is viewed as a reservoir of liquid assets, which is supplied by inflows and outflows.  
This reservoir serves as a cushion, or as a buffer, against variations in the flows. The solvency of the firm can be defined 
in terms of  the probability that  the reservoir  will  be exhausted,  at  which point  the firm will  be unable to pay its  
obligations as they mature. Considering this view of the firm:
• The larger the (initial) reservoir, the smaller the probability of failure.
• The larger the (net liquid-asset) inflows from operations (i.e. cash flow), the smaller the probability of failure.
• The larger the amount of debt held, the greater the probability of failure.
• The larger the expenditures for operations (i.e. outflows from operations), the greater the probability of failure.
With reference to this model, it is reasonable to assume that all distressed firms have some problems regarding this cash 
flow reservoir. Nevertheless, it is obvious that differences exist between distressed firms : some of them have had a too 
small reservoir since their creation, other ones suffer from insufficient inflows or from disproportionate outflows, etc. 
We may thus imagine that  the 203 distressed firms of  the sample may have specific  problems in  function of the 
fundamental reasons for their failure (in function of their EBFP). 
1.2. Ooghe and Van Wymeersch's financial failure path (1986)
Figure 2 : The Financial Failure Path (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch 1986)
Ooghe and Van Wymeersch (1986) argue that the sequence of financial symptoms remains quite similar from one 
distressed firm to another and they present one (general) financial failure path. 
According to their model (Figure 2), the financial downward spiral starts with an insufficient amount of sales compared 













The insufficient or decreasing profitability of the firm leads to a lack of cash flows. This lack of cash flows, eventually 
combined with excessive investments, conducts to a lack of liquidity. Then, as the firm needs cash, the leaders of the 
firm are obliged to look for external financing. Indeed, as the situation of the firm has deteriorated and as the partners 
begin to have some doubt about it, it is difficult to attract new investors in order to increase the equity of the firm. The 
leaders are thus forced to increase the level of external debts (banks, public institutions, etc.) and, as a result, the firm’s 
solvency decreases. Finally, the increase in the level of external debts of the firm finally leads to an increase in its 
financial expenses.
The increase in the financial expenses of the firm, combined with the increasing deterioration of its organizational 
situation, leads to an additional decrease in the firm’s profitability. Subsequently, there is a more substantial lack of cash 
flows and more significant liquidity problems. This is why the level of external debts increases again and the financial 
expenses too… etc.
1.3. Laitinen's financial failure processes (1991)
Laitinen identifies three alternative types of financial failure processes. 
Firstly, the chronic failure process refers to firms in which almost all financial ratios are poor already in the fourth year 
before bankruptcy.
Secondly,  the  revenue financing failure process  relates  to firms whose indebtedness  and static  liquidity are on an 
average level in every year before bankruptcy. However, the sufficiency of revenue financing is rather low because of a 
poor profitability and of a slow accumulation of revenues.
Thirdly, the acute failure process concerns firms where almost all the financial ratios dramatically deteriorate in the first 
year before bankruptcy.
1.4. A coherent conceptual framework 
The  three  models  presented  before  are  coherent  and  they are  even  complementary for  a  global  understanding  of 
financial distress. Indeed, 
• At first, the model of Beaver (1966) perceives the firm as a liquidity reservoir and it stresses how financial 
distress  can  originate  from distinctive  problems with  this  reservoir.  This  model  concentrates  thus  on  the 
working of the liquidity reservoir of the firm and it highlights its potential deficiencies.
• Then,  the  model  of  Ooghe and  Van Wymeersch  (1986)  shows how financial  symptoms deteriorate  (as  a 
financial failure process) once the firm is in distress. This model concentrates on the general (financial) steps 
through which all distressed firms pass through until their potential bankruptcy.
• Finally, the model of Laitinen (1991) focuses on how the deterioration of the financial symptoms of firms can 




Based on the conceptual framework presented in the Introduction and in Section 1, this section presents the hypotheses 
that are tested in the present study. It is divided into two sub-sections :
• Section 2.1. presents two general hypotheses which concern all distressed firms.
• Section 2.2. elaborates a series of hypotheses which are specific to each pattern, in order to test if relationships 
can be traced between the typical fundamental (organizational) problems and financial symptoms.
2.1. General hypotheses8
Firstly, as the sample only consists of distressed9 firms, by definition, all are engaged into a financial downward spiral 
(Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 1986) and all of them are thus confronted to problems regarding Beaver's cash flow model 
(1966), i.e. problems of original size, problems of inflows or problems of outflows. As Ooghe and Van Wymeersch state 
(1986), it is reasonable to assume that, globally, their financial ratios deteriorate more and more when approaching the 
year N.
H1 : Globally, when evolving towards N, the financial ratios of the sampled firms deteriorate more and more. 
Secondly, as the sample of firms consists of firms considered as distressed firms by the Court of Commerce of Liège, 
we may assume that, globally, the sampled firms have liquidity and solvency problems in N. Indeed, as Ooghe and Van 
Wymeersch remember (1996), the criteria used by the Court to detect distressed firms are based on these two financial 
dimensions.
H2 : Globally, all the sampled firms have a weak solvency and a weak liquidity in N.
2.2. Specific hypotheses 
Specific  hypotheses  are  constructed  for  each  pattern  in  order  to  test  if  relationships  can  be  traced  between  the 
fundamental (organizational) problems and financial symptoms. All these hypotheses are elaborated on the basis of a 
combination of the description of the EBFPs presented in the Introduction (Crutzen, 2009) with the information, either 
expressed or latent, contained in the models of Beaver (1966), Ooghe and Van Wymeersch (1986) and Laitinen (1991). 
10
2.2.1. Shocked firms (EBFP 1)
With reference to Crutzen (2009), this pattern refers to small  firms that fail after one or several shocks such as the 
8 The general hypotheses are directly deducted from the models presented below. 
9 Firms that are engaged into a failure process and whose (organizational) situation is so much deteriorated that they 
show (external) signs of failure (financial failure symptoms mainly).
10 In the context of this study, the hypotheses are not necessarily synchronized : they should be considered separately.
6
bankruptcy of an important customer or the firm's takeover. These shocks are punctual events in the firm's life and they 
provoke its entry into a failure process because the entrepreneurs state that their firm had no particular problems before 
this shock.
Considering this description, we may assume that firms belonging to this pattern are associated with non problematic 
financial indicators (compared to other firms) before the occurrence of the shock  and that their financial situation 
(added value,  profitability, solvency and liquidity) suddenly deteriorates after this event. By definition, we may thus 
assume that firms belonging to this pattern tend to follow an acute financial failure process (Laitinen, 1991) : problems 
in their liquidity reservoir appear suddenly (Beaver, 1966) and the deterioration of their financial symptoms (Ooghe and 
Van Wymeersch) is quite rapid.
H1a : Shocked firms are associated with non problematic11 ratios before the occurrence of the shock.
H1b : Shocked firms are associated with a sudden deterioration of their financial ratios after the occurrence of the  
shock. 
2.2.2. Firms serving other interests (EBFP 2)
This pattern relates to small firms whose operations mainly serve other interests than their own ones. In these firms, the 
(personal  or  professional)  objectives  of  the  entrepreneurs  are,  consciously or  unconsciously,  not  aligned  with  the 
corporate  goals.  The  predominance  of  the  entrepreneur's  personal  interests  over  the  firm's  ones  (such  as  a 
disproportionate amount of shareholders' receivables) and fraudulent activities are strongly associated to EBFP 2.
Regarding this definition, we may assume that these firms are often associated with missing data. This situation can 
notably be explained by the following two elements. Firstly, their leaders may try to hide their fraudulent activities or 
abnormal practices, so that, even if they have made up financial statements, they do not publish them (or hand them 
over to outsiders for evaluation). Secondly, the (expert)accountant who produces the annual accounts and who has to 
validate them may refuse to publish them if he notes some malpractices.
In addition, we may assume that these firms are associated with a weak liquidity for a longer time than other sampled 
firms.  Indeed,  the  liquidity problems of  firms  belonging to  other  EBFPs  are  generally the  consequences  of  other 
fundamental problems and of a progressive deterioration of their (organizational and financial) situation (Ooghe and 
Van Wymeersch, 1986). In contrast, Crutzen and Van Caillie (2009) stress that, in most of the firms belonging to EBFP 
2, the main fundamental problem is that the entrepreneurs withdraw the cash for other uses than those required by the 
activities of the firms. 
H2a : Firms belonging to EBFP 2 are often associated with missing data.
H2b : Firms belonging to EBFP 2 are associated with a weak liquidity for a longer time than other sampled firms.
11 As the database only consists of distressed firms, it is reasonable to assume that, globally, this pattern should be 
associated with less poor ratios (than other firms) before the occurrence of the shock.
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2.2.3. Apathetic firms (EBFP 3)
This pattern concerns small firms that become progressively misaligned with their environment because their leaders 
lack the ability to anticipate events and to adapt to (progressive) changes. The main fundamental reasons for their 
progressive misalignment with their external environment is the lack of dynamism and the loss of motivation of their 
leaders.
Referring  to  this  description,  we  may assume  that  these  firms  tend  to  follow a  chronic  financial  failure  process 
(Laitinen, 1991) : their (financial) situation deteriorates progressively over years. 
At  first,  we may assume  that  these  (older)  firms  tend  to  have  an  important  structure  compared  to  their  level  of 
activities12. As these firms become progressively misaligned with their environment, they are thus globally associated 
with a weak and decreasing level of activities compared to their asset structure. 
In  addition, we may assume that  these firms, whose structure,  strategy and management (methods)  have not  been 
progressively adapted to the evolution of their environment, have had a poor added value and profitability since a longer 
time than other firms. Indeed, the structure of these firms generates expenses (fixed costs, personnel costs, etc.) that are 
too important compared to their (weak and decreasing) level of activities. In particular, this leads to disproportionate 
personnel costs compared to added value, to a poor return on investment and to poor cash flows ratios. Nevertheless, as 
their financial failure process is a chronic one, we may expect that, when approaching N13, these ratios continue to 
decrease but less rapidly than the ratios of firms belonging to other EBFPs. 
H3a : Firms belonging to EBFP 3 are associated with a weak (and decreasing) level of activities compared to other  
firms in the years preceding N.
H3b: Firms belonging to this EBFP are associated with a weak (and decreasing) added value and profitability for a  
longer time than other firms but, globally, in the years close to N, this decrease is more progressive than in other firms'.
2.2.4. Firms that fail after a punctual managerial error (EBFP 4)
The fourth pattern identifed by Crutzen (2009) is related to a punctual (strategic) managerial error, which is linked to 
the (in)ability of the entrepreneur to correctly analyze the firm's environment, to anticipate changes and to adapt the 
firm to it. It concerns firms that fail because they are founded on a non-viable business plan or because a managerial 
decision that does not have the expected consequences (such as a missed strategic reorientation or failed big investment) 
is made. 
Considering the above-mentioned description, we may assume that, once their punctual strategic managerial error is 
made, these firms are confronted to a sudden decrease in their level of activities compared to their assets (including the 
investments related to this decision). Indeed, the implementation of this decision generally induces investments (i.e. an 
increase in the assets of the firm) that are not followed by the expected increase in the volume of activities. 
Furthermore, once the managerial error is made, all other financial indicators are very poor compared to those of other 
12 Over-sized firms
13 In the years directly preceding N
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firms (except EBFP 5a and 5b)14. Indeed, the implementation of this decision results in a firm with a totally non-viable 
strategic position on its market. For example, there is no (more) demand for the firm's products. 
H4a : Firms belonging to EBFP 4 are associated with a (sudden) weak level of activities compared to their structure,  
consecutive to an inadequate managerial decision.
H4b : Firms belonging to EBFP 4 are associated with very poor financial indicators on all the dimensions, consecutive  
to an inadequate managerial decision. 
2.2.5. Badly-managed firms (EBFP 5)
This pattern includes small firms whose entrepreneurs lack the required managerial competences to override the first 
stages of their life cycle (creation and growth phases). 
Three sub-patterns are distinguished by Crutzen (2009) :
• EBFP 5a refers to firms with deficiencies in strategic management.
• EBFP 5b concerns firms which are totally badly-managed because their strategic management as well as their 
business administration is problematic.
• EBFP 5c relates to firms with deficiencies in business administration.
Considering the descriptions proposed by Crutzen (2009) for these sub-patterns, we make the assumption that firms 
belonging to EBFP 5c, i.e. firms which have real potentialities on their market but which are confronted to problems of 
internal management, show specific financial indicators compared to firms belonging to EBFP 5a or 5b, i.e. firms which 
do not have any real potentialities on their market because of deficiencies in strategic management.
• EBFP 5a and EBFP 5b  
These  sub-patterns  refer  to  firms  in  which  there  is  an  inadequate  internal  management  of  external  factors  :  the 
entrepreneur lacks the ability to analyze correctly the firm's environment, to anticipate adequately changes in it and to 
adapt to them. Under these circumstances, in the first stages of their life cycle, the real potentialities of these firms on 
their market are over-estimated or even inexistent15. 
Considering this description, we may assume that these firms are often associated with missing data. This assumption 
can notably be explained by the following elements. 
14 Indeed, this failure pattern can be associated with EBFP 5a and 5b because all relate to strategic managerial 
problems which lead to a lack of demand for the firm's products. The two main differences between EBFP 4 and 
EBFP 5a and 5b are : 
-    EBFP 4 relates to punctual strategic errors (such as a non viable business plan or a missed strategic reorientation) 
that make the firm completely non viable, even if the entrepreneurs/leaders are competent. EBFP 5a and 5b rather 
concern  firms lead by entrepreneurs with recurrent strategic managerial deficiencies. For example, their firm starts 
on a wrong basis (an inadequate business plan) and they are unable to implement the needed strategic changes. 
- EBFP 4 does not refer to particular stages of the firm's life cycle : it refers to pure punctual strategic error. EBFP 5a 
and 5b only refer to strategic deficiencies in the first phases (creation or growth) of a firm's life.  
15 Regarding Beaver's model (1966), these firms do not succeed in generating sufficient inflows. 
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Firstly, as firms belonging to these two (sub)patterns have no (or few) potentialities on their market in the first stages of 
their life cycle, we may assume that a large part of them are very young when they become distressed. It is then logical 
that most of them have never published any financial accounts before N16, when they are detected as distressed firms by 
the Court. 
Secondly, their leaders may try to hide the poor beginning of their firm by voluntarily delaying the publication of their 
financial accounts. 
Thirdly, some negligent or non-motivated entrepreneurs may forget (or even not be aware of) the Belgian law that 
makes it compulsory for all incorporated firms to publish their financial statements17. Under these circumstances, they 
may, for example, not provide their accountant with the required documents to produce financial accounts.
With reference to the definitions proposed for these two sub-patterns, we may also assume that, compared to other 
distressed  firms,  when  financial  data  are  available,  these  firms  are  associated  with  very  poor  ratios  in  the  years 
preceding N. As we assume that these firms have few, or even no, potentialities on their market, we may assume that 
their level of activities, their added value, their profitability, their solvency and their liquidity are globally very poor 
since N-2.
H5a : Firms belonging to EBFP 5a and EBFP 5b are often associated with missing data.
H5b: Firms belonging to EBFP 5a and EBFP 5b are associated with very poor financial  indicators (on the five  
dimensions) since N-2.
• EBFP 5c  
This sub-pattern relates to firms with deficiencies in business administration. In these firms, the strategic management is 
not  problematic :  they have real  potentialities  on their  markets (adequate level  of activities,  real  demand for their 
products or services, etc.). The factors that fundamentally explain their failure are a poor ability to control the firm (and 
eventually its growth), a problematic financial management (such as an inadequate cost pricing) or a poor accounting 
management in the first stages of their life cycle. In the 21 sampled firms out of the 35 that belong to this pattern, these  
problems have been present since the creation of the firm whereas, in the 14 other firms, they arise with its growth.
Considering the description of this failure sub-pattern,  we may thus assume that  these firms are associated with a 
disproportionate level of activities (net sales) compared to their structure18. Indeed :
– As mentioned above, in 14 of the sampled firms, the entrepreneur has it difficult to control the firm's growth : 
16 Indeed, in Belgium, firms have to close their financial statements in the six months following the end of their 
reporting period. The financial accounts have to be deposited and, then,  published at the Belgian National Bank one 
month after this closing (Moniteur Belge, 1999, Loi contenant le Code des sociétés, art. 92-98)
17 The Belgian law distinguishes between two schemes in order to present the financial accounts : a complete and a 
abbreviated scheme (Moniteur belge, 1975 - Loi du 17 juillet 1975 relative à la comptabilité des entreprises). 
(Small) firms that do not exceed more than one of the following limits may publish their accounts according to an 
abbreviated scheme : 50 workers, net sales = 7.3 million Euros, total balance sheet = 3.6 million Euros. 
Nevertheless, firms employing more than 100 workers have necessarily to present their financial accounts according 
to a complete scheme.
18 These firms may nevertheless be growing
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the net sales rise but he does not succeed in adapting and in adequately managing the firm's structure according 
to this new level of activities.
– Furthermore, in a lot of start-ups belonging to this pattern, the entrepreneur fights for revenues (net sales) 
while he does not have the adequate resources and resources' deployment (small initial financial capital, lack of 
cash to finance the activities, etc.). 
In addition, as almost one half of these firms are confronted to growth-related problems, we may assume that this 
pattern is much more associated with financial indicators referring to the firm's growth than other patterns. We may thus 
hypothesize that, in the years preceding N, firms belonging to EBFP 5c are associated with a higher rate of growth in 
total assets than other firms.
H5c : Firms belonging to EBFP 5c are associated with a high level of activities compared to their structure in the years  
preceding N.




The sample of firms studied in the present research is similar to the one used by Crutzen (2009) : it is composed of 
20319 incorporated small distressed firms under the investigation of the Court of Commerce of Liège for a Commercial 
Inquiry, a Legal Reorganization or a Bankruptcy.
3.2. Variables
The data included in the present study are : 
• Some intrinsic characteristics of the firm : its name, its official number, its age in N, the number of workers it 
employed in N, its net sales as well as its total balance sheet in N.
• The  year  in  which  the  first  external  signals were  detected  by  the  Court  and  considered  as  relevant  and 
sufficiently intense by this entity, so that it regards each firm as a distressed firm (N).
• The EBFP with which each sampled firm was associated by Crutzen (2009).
• Ten20 financial  ratios  which  were  chosen  on  the  basis  of  the  work  of  Beaver  (1966),  of  Ooghe  and  Van 
Wymeersch (1986, 2006) and of Laitinen (1991). With reference to these studies, five main (financial) dimensions are 
taken into consideration. From the most symptomatic to the most fundamental ones, the liquidity, the solvency, the 
profitability and the added value dimensions are analyzed (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 1986, 2006). A fifth dimension 
19 Indeed the taxonomy identified by Crutzen (2009) and Crutzen and Van Caillie (2009) does not include 5 (emerging) 
innovative firms regarding their very specific behavior (in terms of reasons for failure).
20 A supplementary ratio (Working Capital Requirements to Net Assets) was tested. That is why it appears in our 
graphs (see Appendix 3) but, as it did not lead to any significant result, this ratio was drawn from the definitive 
analysis. 
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referring to  the firm's  activities  (or  firm's  operations)  is  also  considered  in  the  present  study.  This  last  dimension 
includes financial information which refers to the firm's growth and to its revenue accumulation (Laitinen, 1991). Ratios 
reflecting these five dimensions were selected  amongst the ratios used in these three preceding studies. 
Table 2 lists these ten ratios and Appendix 1 details how they are calculated.
Dimension Ratio Label Previous researchers
Beaver 
(1966)
Ooghe  & 




Liquidity Current ratio LL X X
Quick ratio LS X
Solvency Equity ratio S X X X
Profitability Cash Flow from Operations21 
/Total Debt ratio 
CF/D X X
Cash Flow from Operations 
/Total Assets ratio
CF/A X
Return on Investment ratio ROI X X X
Added Value Personnel Costs/Added Value ratio FP/V X
Added Results/Added Value ratio RA/V X
Firm's 
operations
Net Sales/Total Assets ratio CA/A X X
Rate of Growth in Total Assets ratio AC X
Table 2 : List of ratios 
When data were available, these ratios were calculated22, for each sampled firm, over the seven years preceding its first 
detection by the Court (from N-7 to N)23 in order to identify, as soon as possible, potential differences in financial 
behaviors between firms belonging to the distinctive EBFPs. 
After an examination of the database24, it comes out that, as Laitinen already mentioned (1991), the distributions of the 
21 The notion of Cash Flow from Operations refers to the amount of cash generated by the firm's activities. That is why 
we place it in the profitability dimension, but close to the liquidity dimension. It is worth remembering that the 
structure of the financial accounts (balance sheet and income statement) can differ from one country to another one 
(Stickney et al., 2007). In Belgium, we refer to financial reporting standards that are sometimes different from the 
ones used in other countries. This leads to “false friends” or semantic differences in the definition of some terms. 
The term Cash Flow from Operations considered in the present study has been chosen and defined on the basis of 
the work of Ooghe and Van Wymeersch (1986, 1996, 2006). Indeed, these Belgian researchers carried out studies on 
financial analysis and, in particular, on business failures in the same (legal) context as we do and they highlight the 
importance of ratios relating the Cash Flow from Operations in their study of business failures. The Cash Flow from 
Operations is then calculated as follows : Receipts from Operations – Expenditures for Operations (or Operating 
profit + unpaid expenses). This definition of the (Operating) Cash Flow is different from the one used by Laitinen 
(1994) because it does not include any information from the balance sheet, such as accruals or deferrals, which can 
notably be manipulated or “adjusted” (via creative accounting) in order to improve the externally-visible financial 
situation of failing firms (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 1986). 
22 The database was then checked in order to verify if there were no errors or missing data.
23 This time period was determined with reference to the results of the studies of Van Wymeersch and Wolf”s (1996) 
and of Van Caillie and Dighaye (2002) as well as according to the availability of the data
24 Indeed, after a Shapiro Wilks' W test of normality (carried out for a series of ratios), it comes out that the W statistic 
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ratios generally do not statistically conform to the normality at normal risk levels. Under these circumstances, it  is 
reasonable to assume that the application of classical parametric statistical techniques to the available data would not 
lead to reliable results and that a nonparametric statistical method is much more appropriate to treat the data. 
In order to allow the use of nonparametric statistical techniques, all the (quasi) continuous data composing the database 
were transformed into discrete data (nominal or ordinal data) thanks to a grouping in classes (Bouroche and Saporta, 
2005). 
Firstly, concerning the intrinsic characteristics of the sampled firms, the modalities of the (quasi) continuous variables, 
such as firm's age and size (personnel, net sales and total balance sheet), were grouped into a determined amount of 
classes (Bouroche and Saporta,  2005).  The various classes were chosen by considering the lessons from important 
Belgian research on small business (failure) (Donckels et al., 1993; Unizo, 2007; Graydon, 2009).
Secondly, all the distinctive values of the ratios were transformed into deciles (discrete and ordinal data). Under these 
conditions, if the current ratio of a firm belongs to  the  upper decile (10), this means that this firm has a very good 
liquidity compared to most firms from the sample. However, it is worth remembering that the sample consists only of 
distressed firms. Thus, a value of 10 does not necessarily means that the liquidity of this firm is good but rather that it is 
better than the liquidity of other firms of the sample.
In order to conclude the presentation of the sample and of the variables included in the present study, Table 3 presents 
descriptive statistics (valid N, mean, minimum, maximum, variance and standard deviation) about the sampled firms by 
(sub)EBFP in function of their age and size (personnel, turnover (CA) and total assets (AT)), when they are detected by 
the Court (in N).
is generally significant and that, then, the hypothesis that the respective distribution is normal should be rejected.
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Table 3 : Descriptive statistics of the sample by EBFP
In addition, as the variable “Firm's Age” appears to be a significant characteristic in explaining the origins of business 
failure (Thornhill and Amit, 2003), Table 4 details the age of the sampled firms in N, by EBFP.
Missing 
Data <= 3 years <= 5 years <= 10 years <= 15 years > 15 years Row
EBFP 1 2 6 2 12 9 10 41
0,99% 2,96% 0,99% 5,91% 4,43% 4,93% 20,20%
EBFP 2 0 3 6 4 4 3 20
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EBFPs Variables Valid N Mean Sum Minimum Maximum Variance Std.Dev.
Age (N) 39 11,6923 456,000 1,00000 27,000 51,2 7,1567
Pers (N) 39 3,7179 145,000 0,00000 17,000 12,4 3,5240
CA (N) 10 509,7000 5097,000 63,00000 1320,000 252912,9 502,9045
AT (N) 20 414,1000 8282,000 19,00000 2893,000 460246,5 678,4147
Age (N) 20 8,350 167,000 1,0000 24,000 40 6,352
Pers (N) 14 9,857 138,000 0,0000 40,000 159 12,618
CA (N) 7 1042,857 7300,000 174,0000 2909,000 1333319 1154,695
AT (N) 8 888,875 7111,000 127,0000 2460,000 642620 801,636
Age (N) 15 22,600 339,00 9,00000 37,00 67 8,166
Pers (N) 13 8,923 116,00 0,00000 48,00 153 12,366
CA (N) 3 971,667 2915,00 61,00000 2238,00 1279706 1131,241
AT (N) 7 4001,857 28013,00 64,00000 24851,00 84715314 9204,092
Age (N) 36 6,9167 249,000 1,00000 29,000 48,5 6,9627
Pers (N) 34 5,5588 189,000 0,00000 41,000 66,6 8,1620
CA (N) 10 831,4000 8314,000 88,00000 3165,000 992059,8 996,0220
AT (N) 17 531,1765 9030,000 21,00000 2883,000 651745,2 807,3073
Age (N) 28 4,1786 117,000 1,00000 12,0000 10,82 3,2892
Pers (N) 26 3,4231 89,000 0,00000 12,0000 9,05 3,0090
CA (N) 3 238,3333 715,000 40,00000 601,0000 98934,33 314,5383
AT (N) 14 189,8571 2658,000 22,00000 460,0000 18256,90 135,1181
Age (N) 25 2,7200 68,000 0,0000 9,0000 4,88 2,2083
Pers (N) 24 6,2500 150,000 0,0000 18,0000 28,80 5,3670
CA (N) 3 421,6667 1265,000 189,0000 601,0000 44569,33 211,1145
AT (N) 10 351,4000 3514,000 11,0000 686,0000 51770,93 227,5323
Age (N) 37 7,351 272,00 1,00000 22,000 31 5,609
Pers (N) 34 7,824 266,00 0,00000 37,000 71 8,412
CA (N) 10 2431,200 24312,00 34,00000 9984,000 10442637 3231,507
AT (N) 20 898,100 17962,00 23,00000 3538,000 1273775 1128,616
EBFP  1  
(41 firms)
EBFP 2   
(20 firms)
EBFP 3   
(15 firms)
EBFP 4   
(36 firms)




EBFP 5c  
(37 firms)
0,00% 1,48% 2,96% 1,97% 1,97% 1,48% 9,85%
EBFP 3 0 0 0 1 2 12 15
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,49% 0,99% 5,91% 7,39%
EBFP 4 0 17 6 4 6 3 36
0,00% 8,37% 2,96% 1,97% 2,96% 1,48% 17,73%
EBFP 5a 0 18 1 7 2 0 28
0,00% 8,87% 0,49% 3,45% 0,99% 0,00% 13,79%
EBFP 5b 1 20 3 2 0 0 26
0,49% 9,85% 1,48% 0,99% 0,00% 0,00% 12,81%
EBFP 5c 0 13 4 10 6 4 37
0,00% 6,40% 1,97% 4,93% 2,96% 1,97% 18,23%
All Grps 3 77 22 40 29 32 203
1,48% 37,93% 10,84% 19,70% 14,29% 15,76%
Table 4 : Age of the sampled firms by EBFP 
3.3. Data analysis
The hypotheses were tested through a correspondence analysis25 (Benzécri, 1973; Lebart et al.,  1977; Lebart et al., 
1984; Greenacre, 1984; Bouroche and Saporta, 2005). Indeed, this non-parametric multivariate data analysis technique 
allows  to  highlight  the  proximities  between  the  modalities  of  discrete  variables  considered  as  active  (i.e.  the  ten 
financial ratios) and the modalities of a discrete variable considered as passive (i.e. the EBFPs). This statistical analysis 
associates each EBFP with the modalities of the financial ratios (calculated from N-7 to N) which explain it the best. 
This analysis permits thus to see which modalities (deciles) of the ratios are much more commonly linked with the 
various failure patterns.
The results of the correspondence analysis were completed and validated by the analysis of 2D graphs (or Box Plots) 
representing  how  the  raw  values  of  the  ratios  are  distributed  for  each  EBFP.  These  graphs  represent  the  main 
characteristics (median, for example) of the raw values of the various financial ratios and they place a box around the 
midpoint (i.e. median) which represents a selected range (i.e., from 25 to 75 % of the cases) and whiskers outside of the 
box which also represent a selected range (i.e. non outliers range)26. The analysis of this graph provides interesting 
information about the real distribution of each ratio and about the magnitude of the degradation of each ratio (for each 
EBFP) year after year.
4. Results
As explained in the Methodology section, two complementary statistical analyses were carried out in order to identify 
potential relationships between the EBFPs and specific financial indicators in the years preceding N. 
Appendix 2 presents the variables (and their labels) which are included in the statistical analyses.
25 The statistical analysis was achieved with the help of the software Statistica (Version 7, 1984-2005)
26 The minimum and maximum values taken by the ratio without including the outliers
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Firstly, Appendix 3 presents the results of the correspondence analysis, with a focus on the EBFPs and their related 
ratios.  Considering the high number of  variables  and modalities,  four correspondence analysis were carried out  in 
function of the various financial dimensions investigated in the present study : 
- A correspondence analysis including the ratios relating to the firm's operations (Figure 1)
- A correspondence analysis referring to the added value ratios (Figure 2)
- A correspondence analysis including the profitability ratios (Figure 3)
- A correspondence analysis including the liquidity and solvency ratios (Figure 4)
were successively carried out. 
These 2D figures  show which modalities  of  the ratios (active variables)  are much more associated to  each EBFP 
(passive variable).
Secondly, Appendix 4 presents the Box Plots for each ratio in function of the distinctive EBFPs.
The results of these two statistical analyses were used in parallel in order to test the hypotheses presented in Section 2.
4.1. General findings
4.1.1. General observations
Firstly, the correspondence analyses associate very few modalities of the 10 ratios to specific EBFP before N-3. Indeed, 
Appendix 3 shows that only two financial ratios, which relate to firms' structure (Net Sales/Total Assets and Rate of 
Growth in Total Assets ratios) are associated to EBFP 3 already 5 years before N. Apart from these exceptional (and, 
nevertheless, meaningful) observations, the financial behavior of the sampled firms can thus not be associated with one 
particular failure pattern before N-3 and there is thus no significant difference in terms of financial indicators between 
the EBFPs before N-3. This observation can partially be explained by the fact that, as Table 4 shows, lots of the sampled 
firms are young in N :  77 firms are three years old or less when they are firstly detected by the Court. It  is thus 
impossible to get information before N-3 for these firms as they were still not created at that time. 
This first general observation is consistent with the results of the studies carried out by Laitinen (1991) and by Van 
Wymeersch  and Wolfs  (1996).  Indeed,  while  they firstly consider  a  longer  time period27,  these researchers  finally 
interpret (financial) data relating to the four or five years before bankruptcy (or legal reorganization).
Considering this observation, the following part of the current study focuses thus mainly on a more relevant time period 
: it analyzes the 10 ratios between N-4 and N28.
Secondly, the first dimension highlighted by the correspondence analyses is the time dimension. An analysis of the 
variables which are the most correlated to Dimension 1 and an examination of the column coordinates of the different 
modalities of the variables (on Dimension 1) lead to this observation. Therefore, some EBFPs, which are located on the 
right side of the graphs, are associated to financial indicators earlier (in N-5, N-4 or N-3) than other ones. The failure 
patterns that are the earliest associated with financial indicators are EBFP 3 and EBFP 1. These patterns could thus be 
identified with reference to some financial symptoms before N. In contrast, firms belonging to EBFP 5a or 5b are much 
27 For example, Laitinen (1991) considers the 6 years before bankruptcy in his study.
28 That's why the Box Plots were only drawn from N-4 to N.
16
hardly related to particular financial ratios until N. It would therefore be difficult to detect them and to identify the 
fundamental reasons for their failure (i.e. their EBFP) on the basis of financial information only.
Thirdly, the correspondence analysis confirms that there is a significant relationship between the age, the size of the 
firms (in N) and the EBFPs. For example, EBFP 5a and 5b mainly refer to very young firms, i.e. firms younger than 3 
years, and to very small firms, i.e. firms without workers or with less than 5 workers and firms with a small amount of 
total assets and net sales. 
4.1.2. Validation of the general hypotheses
H1: Globally, when evolving from N-7 to N, the financial ratios of the sampled firms deteriorate more  
and more
Validated
H2: Globally, the solvency and the liquidity of the sampled firms are weak in N Partially 
validated
Firstly, H1 is validated because, when looking at the global evolution of the (raw) values of all the ratios for all the 
EBFPs  from N-7  to  N (see  Appendix  4),  it  comes  clearly  out  that  the  financial  situation29 of  the  sampled  firms 
deteriorates when they evolve towards N.
Secondly,  H2 is partially validated.  Actually,  Figure 3 shows that the solvency  (S_N) of the sample is weak in N. 
Indeed, the mean value of the equity ratio is around zero for all the EBFPs and there are a lot of negative values 30. This 
means that lots of sampled firms are totally dependent on external debts. 
29 On the five dimensions under consideration.
30 If the total net assets (Total assets – Provisions - Total Debts) are reduced to an amount that is inferior to half of the 
amount of the capital (shareholders' shares), the Belgian legislation estimates the firm has solvency problems 
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Figure 3 : Solvency of the sampled firms in N, by EBFP
Nevertheless, when looking at the liquidity position of firms in N (Figure 4), it comes out that all firms do not show 
weak liquidity ratios at this time.  
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Figure 5 :Quick ratio in N-1, by EBFP
Even if some firms, such as those belonging to EBFP 5a, 5b or 4, have a weak31 quick ratio in N, the ratio of firms 
belonging to EBFPs 1, 2 and 3 is not that weak. For example, the median value of the quick ratio for firms belonging to 
EBFP 2 is close to 1 in N. More surprisingly, a comparison between Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows that the liquidity of 
some distressed  firms (EBFPs  2  or  3)  even  improves  in  N (compared  to  N-1).  This  observation can  be  partially 
explained by the fact that, after a first contact with the Court in N, it is reasonable to assume that :
• Corrective or palliative32 actions are (directly) taken in order to recover in the short or in the long term. 
• Creative accounting is sometimes used in order to make the information provided by the financial statements 
more favorable to the firm and, thus, in order to avoid more serious problems such as the legal reorganization 
or the bankruptcy33.
H2 can thus only be partially validated.
4.2. Specific hypotheses
H1a: Shocked firms are associated with non problematic ratios before the occurrence of the shock. Not validated
H1b: Shocked firms are associated with a sudden deterioration of their financial ratios after the  
occurrence of the shock.
Not validated
H2a: Firms belonging to EBFP 2 are often associated with missing data. Validated
H2b: Firms belonging to EBFP 2 are associated with a weak liquidity for a longer time than other  
sampled firms.
Validated
H3a: Firms belonging to EBFP 3 are associated with a weak (and decreasing) level of activities  
compared to other firms in the years preceding N.
Validated
H3b: Firms belonging to this EBFP are associated with a weak (and decreasing) added value and  
profitability for a longer time than other firms but, globally, in the years close to N, this decrease  
is more progressive than in other firms'.
Validated
H4a: Firms belonging to EBFP 4 are associated with a (sudden) weak level of activities compared  
to their structure, consecutive to an inadequate managerial decision.
Partially 
validated
H4b: Firms belonging to EBFP 4 are associated with very poor financial indicators34 on all the 
dimensions, consecutive to an inadequate managerial decision.
Validated
H5a: Firms belonging to EBFP 5a and EBFP 5b are often associated with missing data. Validated
31 The median value is smaller than 0.3
32 Only long-term corrective actions, which remedy the fundamental problems (causes) of the failure, may lead to a 
durable recovery. Indeed, short-term palliative actions, which only solve some symptomatic problems, may only 
lead to a short-term improvement of the firm's situation. 
33 In this sense, it would be very interesting to analyze, for example, the evolution of shareholder's receivables.
34 Similar to those of EBFP 5a and 5b. Indeed, this failure pattern can be associated with EBFP 5a and 5b because all 
relate to strategic managerial problems which lead to a lack of demand for the firm's products. The two main 
differences between EBFP 4 and EBFP 5a and 5b are : 
-    EBFP 4 relates to punctual strategic errors (such as a non viable business plan or a missed strategic reorientation) 
that make the firm completely non viable, even if the entrepreneurs/leaders are competent. EBFP 5a and 5b rather 
concern  firms lead by entrepreneurs with recurrent strategic managerial deficiencies. For example, their firm starts 
on wrong basis (an inadequate business plan) and they are unable to implement the needed strategic changes. 
- EBFP 4 does not refer to particular stages of the firm's life cycle : it refers to pure punctual strategic error. EBFP 5a 
and 5b refer to strategic deficiencies in the first phases (creation or growth) of a firm's life.  
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H5b:  Firms  belonging  to  EBFP  5a  and  EBFP  5b  are  associated  with  very  poor  financial  
indicators on the five dimensions since N-2.
Validated
H5c: Firms belonging to EBFP 5c are associated with a high level of activities compared to their  
structure in the years preceding N.
Not validated
H5d: Firms belonging to EBFP 5c are associated with a higher rate of growth in total assets than  




Regarding H1a, the correspondence analysis does not clearly associate specific financial symptoms with this pattern 
before N-2. Considering the shock could occur in N, N-1, N-2 or even in a previous year, the information provided by 
this  statistical  analysis  is  thus  not  relevant  to  validate  H1a.  An  analysis  of  the  box  plots  detailing  the  main 
characteristics of the 10 ratios for these firms (see Appendix 4) leads to the following observation. This pattern is 
composed of firms with very heterogeneous financial behaviors on the various financial dimensions considered. Indeed, 
since N-4, EBFP 1 consists of small firms which have a financial situation that ranges from very poor to satisfactory (on 
the various dimensions considered). Thus, the first hypothesis can not be validated : all firms belonging to EBFP 1 do 
not necessarily have a non-problematic financial situation before the occurrence of the shock, which the entrepreneurs 
present as the main fundamental reason for the failure of their firm.
Considering this first observation, it is necessary to relativize the importance to give to this EBFP and to be careful with 
the description proposed for it. In fact, the results of the present analysis reinforce what Argenti (1976) or Ooghe and 
Waeyaert (2004) state : some unfavorable conditions are generally developing within these firms before the occurrence 
of the shock. Thus, in some cases, the shock is only an event that amplifies the firm's failure but it does not explain its 
fundamental origins. Two main situations may be distinguished. The firm performed without any important problem 
until this event but it was vulnerable (because of its dependence towards one particular partner, for example) or the firm 
has never performed well but the entrepreneur externalizes (consciously or unconsciously) the reasons for the failure of 
his firm. Nevertheless, we consider that, in some particular cases (such as in the case of a sudden accidental factor), a 
failure pattern relating to shocked firm is meaningful35. 
Referring now to H1b, the two complementary analyses carried out in the current study do not allow to identify a 
significant sudden decrease in the global financial situation of these firms. This hypothesis can thus not be validated on 
the basis of the present study. 
Two explanations can nevertheless be given for this observation. 
• Firstly, as mentioned above, in some cases, the shock is only used as an excuse by the entrepreneur for hiding 
other more fundamental problems and, in particular, his own previous mistakes. In these cases, the firm is 
already engaged into a failure process before the occurrence of the shock. This latter amplifies the failure but it 
does not originate it. So, the entrepreneur exaggerates the impact of the shock on his firm's failure, so that this 
event does not have a so disruptive impact on the firm's financial situation as he argues.
• Secondly, the year in which the shock occurred can be N, N-1, N-2 or even a previous year36. As the ratios are 
35 This is why this pattern will not be deleted from the taxonomy presented in this research. 
36 We do not have this information
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analyzed globally, it is thus practically impossible to identify a (global) sudden deterioration.
4.2.2. Firms serving other interests
Firstly, H2a is validated by the results of the correspondence analysis (see Appendix 3). Indeed, this pattern is often 
associated with missing information on the dimensions considered in this study.37 
Secondly, the correspondence analysis associates this EBFP with a poor quick ratio since N-2. The box plots show that 
firms belonging to this pattern have a poor liquidity since N-4. In fact, Figures 6 to 10 show that the median value of the 
quick ratio for these firms is weaker than for other firms until  N-1. This means that these firms are confronted to 
recurrent  liquidity  problems  compared  to  other  firms  (whose  liquidity  deteriorates  progressively  until  N  as  a 
consequence of other fundamental problems). 
Figure 6 : Quick ratio in N-4, by EBFP
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Figure 7 : Quick ratio in N-3, by EBFP
Figure 8 : Quick ratio in N-2, by EBFP:
Figure 9 : Quick ratio in N-1, by EBFP
Figure 10 : Quick ratio in N, by EBFP
Another  relevant  observation comes from the examination of the box plots :  the liquidity of “firms serving other 
interests” significantly improves in N. We may thus assume that, once they have been contacted by the Court, the 
entrepreneurs  of  these  firms  often  take  actions  in  order  to  reduce  the  potential  negative  consequences  of  their 
malpractices or even in order to hide them. For example, they reimburse (a part of) the money they withdrew from the 
firm (via the account dedicated to shareholders' receivables for example) or they use creative accounting in order to 
make the information provided by the financial statements more favorable to the firm and, thus, in order to avoid more 
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The correspondence analysis clearly associates “apathetic firms” (EBFP 3) with a poor level of activities compared to 
the (assets) structure of the firm. Since N-5, the net sales to total assets ratio associated with this EBFP is very poor 
(decile = 1) compared to other firms. 
As, since N-5, this ratio equals to 1 and as the financial situation of all the firms from the sample deteriorates when 
evolving until N, we may thus hypothesize that, from N-5 to N, the level of activities of these firms progressively 
deteriorates compared to their structure, which remains relatively stable. Indeed, the correspondence analysis and the 
box plots dedicated to the measure of the growth in the firms' assets show that, globally, the asset structure of these 
firms remains stable from N-5 until N.  H3a is thus validated by the statistical analysis.
Furthermore, since N-3, the correspondence analysis associates apathetic firms with a high level of personnel costs 
compared to the added value generated by the firm's activities. This confirms that compared to firms belonging to other 
EBFPs,  these  firms have  a (too)  high  structure  (fixed costs,  personnel  costs,  etc.)  compared  to  the  level  of  their 
activities and, in particular, compared to the added value they generate. 
Finally, the correspondence analysis associates this EBFP with intermediate values (decile = 4) for the operating cash 
flow ratios in N-2 and with higher value for these ratios in N. In addition, the box plots show that, globally, these firms 
have poor cash flow ratios from N-4 until N-2 compared to other sampled firms but that, globally, in N-1 and in N, their 
situation has become similar or even better than the one of other firms. 
H3b is thus validated too. Indeed, the statistical analysis shows that : 
- Apathetic firms are confronted to added value and profitability (cash flow) problems earlier than other firms (since N-
4).
- Their added value and their profitability decrease when approaching N.
- But, this decline is more progressive than in other firms. 
4.2.4. Firms that fail because of a punctual (strategic) managerial error
Considering the firm's operation dimension (and H4a), the correspondence analysis associates very little information 
with this fourth EBFP : this latter is close to EBFP 5a and 5b, which are strongly related to missing data. This situation 
can notably be explained by the fact that most of the firms belonging to this pattern (29 out of the 36 firms) are small 
firms that were launched on the basis of a totally non viable business plan, i.e. an enormous initial (punctual) strategic 
error. Therefore, it  is logical to observe that their global financial situation is relatively similar to the one of firms 
belonging to EBFP 5a and 5b. They are associated with a lot of missing data because they have never risen up and they 
are thus very young in N. Their level of activities is very weak compared to their structure since their creation (in N-2 or 
even in N-138). Etc. 
Considering H4a, the box plots show that there is a global decline in the net sales to total assets ratio of these firms in 
N-2 and in N-1. In most of the cases, the strategic managerial error would thus be implemented in N-2 or in N-1. This 
global decrease in firms' level of activities compared to their asset structure in N-2 and in N-1 can actually be explained 
38Indeed, most of these firms are younger than 3 years old in N (see Table 4)
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by the fact that most of these firms were created on the basis of a non viable business plan in N-2 or in N-139. As these 
firms are totally non-viable and have no potential on their market, their arrival in the sample provokes thus a global 
decrease in the global level of activities of these firms.
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that the current statistical analysis does not provide any clear information about firms 
that  fail  after  a punctual  strategic error  which differs from a non viable business plan (such as  a missed strategic 
reorientation). Actually, these firms consist in less than one fifth of the firms belonging to EBFP 4 (7 out of 36) and we 
suppose  that  this  is  why no  significant  specific  financial  indicator  comes  out  of  the  present  study.  Under  these 
circumstances, we consider thus that, to date, H4a can only be partially validated. Indeed, a further investigation of the 
EBFP4 and of its potential relationships with financial indicators is necessary if we want to understand it completely.
Referring now to H4b, the correspondence analysis associates this pattern, either with EBFP 5a and 5b (on the firm's 
operation dimension),  or with poor deciles on the other  financial  dimensions in N-1 and in N. For example,  it  is 
associated with a very poor added result compared to added value in N-1. This means that these firms do not generate,  
or even destroy40, value in N-1. The box plots show that, globally, these firms are associated with very poor financial 
indicators on the various dimensions (added value, profitability and liquidity mainly) since N-4, and, more particularly, 
since N-2 and N-1. H4b can thus be validated. 
4.2.5. Badly-managed firms
Firstly, H5a is validated because the correspondence analysis almost systematically associates EBFP 5a and 5b with 
missing data (on the five financial dimensions). 
Secondly, when the correspondence analysis associates data with these two sub-patterns, these financial indicators relate 
to N-1 or N (because most of these firms are very young in N) and they are very poor. For example, it associates these 
patterns with a very poor return on assets, with a poor operating cash flow to total debts and with a poor operating cash 
flow to total assets in N (decile = 1). The box plots confirm these observations. Furthermore, Appendix 4 shows that, 
similarly to EBFP 4, a large part of the firms belonging to these sub-patterns destroy value since N-241. H5b can thus be 
validated. 
Thirdly, the correspondence analysis and the box plots do not permit to validate H5c. Globally, EBFP 5c is thus not 
significantly  related  to  under-sized  firms,  i.e.  firms  with  a  particularly  high  level  of  activities  compared  to  their 
structure. 
One potential  explanation for  the non-validation of  this  hypothesis is  that  this sub-pattern gathers  together  a  high 
diversity of  firms,  with various  business  administration problems and  with heterogeneous financial  behaviors.  For 
example : 
• Some of these firms only lack the needed cash to finance their activities. They have too high working capital 
requirements compared to the available resources : these firms are profitable but their activities can not be 
adequately financed (problems in the management of the working capital requirements).
39 Indeed the correspondence analysis strongly associated EBFP 4 with young firms in N.
40 Indeed the box plot shows that, in most of these firms, the added result to added value ratio is under zero in N-1.
41 Indeed the box plot shows that, in most of these firms, the added result to added value ratio is under zero in N-1.
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• Some other firms are confronted to problems of internal organization (such as a too high pressure/stress or 
inefficient ways of working). This situation may have different consequences such as too high operational 
expenses42 compared to revenues or increasing delays in delivery, a decreasing quality of the product or service 
and, then, customers' dissatisfaction (and their potential loss).
• In other firms, the entrepreneurs have poor accounting skills and they have inadequately determined their sales 
prices : they sell their product at an inadequate (too low or too high) price. In this case, the firm is unprofitable 
while its potentialities on the market are high. Etc.
• Furthermore, some firms have had problems since their creation while other ones develop well in a first time 
and enter the failure process later (in the growing phase). 
These examples illustrate the fact that this pattern is composed of firms with different business administration problems 
which can lead to a variety of financial problems. Relationships between firms belonging to EBFP 5c and specific 
financial symptoms would probably only be traced after a further segmentation of this pattern into several, even more 
homogeneous, sub-patterns.
Finally, H5d is partially validated because the correspondence analysis associates this failure pattern with a higher rate 
of growth in total assets than other firms in N-3 and N-2. In contrast, this statistical analysis associates EBFP 5c with a 
small (or even with a negative) rate of growth in total assets in N-1. This means that, once they become aware of their 
uncontrolled growth, the entrepreneurs made corrective actions, already in N-1. The box plots confirm this observation. 
Indeed, Appendix 4 shows that the median value for this ratio (i.e. the rate of growth in total assets) for EBFP 5c is 
significantly higher than for other EBFPs. Furthermore, this ratio remains globally positive for these firms in N-3 and in 
N-2 while it is globally negative for other ones. This means that, globally, while other firms tend to decrease their asset  
size, firms belonging to EBFP 4 are still growing in N-3 and in N-2. 
Table 5 briefly summarizes the relationships identified between the EBFPs and financial indicators.
EBFP Relationships with financial ratios identified by the statistical analysis
1 Not necessarily an acute (sudden) financial failure process (Non-validation of the hypotheses).
2 Lots of missing data – Poor quick ratio in N-2 and N-1 and dramatic improvement in N.
3 Poor and decreasing net sales to total assets ratio since N-5 – Weak added value and weak profitability that 
decrease more slowly than in other firms since N-2.
4 Global decrease in the net sales to total assets ratio in N-2 and in N-1 – Poor ratios on all dimensions (closed 
to EBFP 5a and 5b).
5a-5b Lots of missing data - Poor ratios on all dimensions since N-2.
5c High rate of growth in total assets in N-3 and in N-2 compared to other firms.
Table 5 : Relationships identified between the EBFPs and financial indicators
5. Discussion
42 Too much personnel, too much activities to support the production, etc.
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The present statistical analysis confirms that different financial failure processes may be distinguished among a sample 
of distressed firms (Laitinen, 1991). Indeed, it shows that some financial failure processes are much more progressive 
than other ones. For example, consistent with the study of Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008), this study shows that firms 
belonging to EBFP 3 tend to follow a more progressive (chronic) financial failure process, which is characterized by a 
progressive deterioration of their financial indicators. 
In addition, this study shows that some specific financial indicators can (sometimes) be roughly associated with the 
explanatory business failure patterns identified by Crutzen (2009). For example, EBFPs 2, 5a and 5b are associated with 
a lot of missing data and EBFP 3 is related to a progressive decrease in the firm's level of activities compared to its asset  
structure.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that, on the basis of the current study, strong and exclusive relationships between each EBFP 
and specific financial symptoms can not be traced. Indeed, the correspondence analysis does not highlight really strong 
relationships between the EBFPs and specific financial ratios : the most obvious associations proposed are relationships 
between the EBFPs and missing data. Under these conditions, in a preventive perspective to failure and on the basis of 
the results of the current study, the early detection of the EBPFs is thus not possible on the basis of specific (traditional) 
financial indicators. 
Several potential reasons for the non-validation of some hypotheses and for the lack of strong relationships between the 
EBFPs and financial indicators are presented below. 
Firstly, as mentioned before, there are a  lot of missing data in the database.  Under these circumstances, it is then 
impossible to relate EBFPs with specific financial information. 
Actually, most of the sampled firms are very young when they are detected by the Court of Commerce of Liège, and, 
eventually, when they disappear via a bankruptcy or a voluntary liquidation. Some of them have thus never published 
any financial  accounts  in  N (or  even  at  the  moment  of  their  disappearance).  Furthermore,  an  examination of  the 
database confirms the observation made by Ohlson (1980) and Lawrence (1983) : as firms go along the last phases of 
the failure process43, the entrepreneurs of distressed firms tend to delay (or even to default) the deposit and, thus, the 
publication of their financial accounts at the Belgian National Bank. Indeed, when financial symptoms become more 
and more significant, the leaders try to hide the poor situation of their firm. 
Secondly, as already explained by Crutzen (2009) and Crutzen and Van Caillie (2009), even if each of the studied firms 
can predominantly be tied up to a particular EBFP, one sole pattern rarely explains completely the firm's deteriorated 
situation when it is detected by the Court (N). The business failure process is generally characterized by a sequence 
of unfavorable circumstances over time and  it  is rather the accumulation (or the sequence) of these unfavorable 
factors  that  leads  to  the  detection  of  the  firm by the  Court.  So,  a  firm  is  often  weakened  by some  unfavorable 
conditions, which can be related to one of the five EBFP, and, then, one or several “aggravating factors”44 bring it to its 
knees (Argenti, 1976; Sheppard, 1994). Nevertheless, the current study focuses on the identification of several typical 
explanatory failure patterns and not of failure paths, which would depict this sequence of events. Therefore, when trying 
43 When significant financial symptoms appear, when approaching N
44 “Aggravating factors” are events which do not fundamentally cause the failure of a firm but which aggravate the 
deterioration of its situation because it is too weak to survive the blow.
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to relate the various EBFPs with specific financial indicators, it does not consider aggravating factors whereas they 
certainly have an impact on the financial symptoms that are shown by the firms when they become distressed. 
Thirdly, the data analyzed do not always necessarily represent the true conditions. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to make sure that the available information is reliable because financial data can be 
manipulated (via creative accounting) in order to hide some unfavorable information such as a poor financial situation 
or malpractices. 
On the other hand, the failure patterns are determined on the basis of the “perceived” fundamental problems explaining 
the entry of the firm in a failure process. Even if we have tried to limit as much as possible the bias related to the 
perceptions of the leaders (subjectivity), notably through triangulation methods (Yin, 1988), the data are primarily based 
on the stories told ex post by the leaders of these distressed firms to a judge or an administrator from the Court. They 
may have a natural tendency to externalize the problems or they may lack hindsight regarding the situation of their firm 
(Bruno et al., 1987).
Fourthly, some EBFPs (EBFPs 1, 4 and 5c) have to be put into perspective or to be refined in order to be able to 
identify some relationships between organizational and financial information. 
Finally, when we consider ex post the whole research process, it is clear that some of the basic assumptions on which 
this paper is founded could be refined. Especially, this study is based on the assumption that the detection system 
used by the Court is meaningful and, thus, the key variable N, i.e. the year at which the sampled firms are considered, 
for the first time, as distressed firms by the Court, is determined on the basis of this system. But, this system does not 
allow to detect firms which are all in the same stage of the failure process in N (Bayard and Lonhienne, 2003). Indeed, 
when they are detected by this system, some firms only face punctual financial problems (such a a short liquidity crisis), 
which can be solved, while other ones have a financial situation that is very close to the legal criteria for bankruptcy 
(critical illiquidity and insolvency). Under these circumstances, comparing the sampled firms, using N as a common 
denominator for choosing the sequential measurement of the ratios, can lead to biases in the results.
Conclusion
The present study confirms that there is a strong relationship between the EBFPs and the intrinsic characteristics of 
firms because the correspondence analysis strongly associates the various patterns with the age, the size (net sales and 
total assets) of firms in N. 
Simultaneously, the current research confirms that, as demonstrated by Laitinen (1991), all the firms do not behave the 
same in terms of financial indicators once they enter and evolve in the distress phase of the failure process. Different 
financial failure processes may thus be distinguished among small distressed firms. Actually, the statistical analysis 
corroborates that it is rather the first symptoms (or early warning signals, such as a very high or very weak net sales to 
total  assets  ratio)  and  the  speed  at  which  the  financial  symptoms deteriorate  that  vary from one  firm to  another 
(D'Aveni, 1989a; Laitinen, 1991). The present study shows for example that the deterioration of the firms' financial 
situation can be more or  less progressive,  notably in function of the EBFP to which they belong.  In  a  preventive 
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perspective to failure, this implies that the failure can be detected45 much earlier for some firms (such as EBFP 3) than 
for other ones (such as EBFP 5). 
Furthermore, this study stresses that specific financial indicators can be roughly associated with some of the explanatory 
business failure patterns identified by Crutzen (2009) and Crutzen and Van Caillie (2009). Nevertheless, it is obvious 
that, on the basis of the current study, strong and exclusive relationships between each EBFP and specific financial 
symptoms can not be traced. Indeed, the correspondence analysis does not highlight really strong relationships between 
the EBFPs and specific financial ratios : the most obvious associations proposed are relationships between the EBFPs 
and missing data. 
Under these conditions, while previous researchers demonstrate that financial ratios are useful to measure failure risks 
in a predictive perspective, the current study leads to the conclusion that, in a preventive perspective to failure, the early 
detection of the EBPFs is not possible on the basis of a series of (traditional) financial indicators. Several potential 
reasons for these observations have been presented in the fifth section, dedicated to a discussion of the results.
Even if it provides some interesting insights about relationships between organizational and financial failure factors, the 
present study raises new issues and it provides thus suggestions for future studies about this phenomenon. 
Firstly, some EBFPs have to be further investigated in the future. 
• EBFP 1 (“shocked firms”) has to be put into perspective because the present study stresses again that shocks 
are often an excuse taken by the entrepreneurs in order to free themselves of guilt. 
• Furthermore, EBFP 4 (“firms that fail after a punctual strategic error”) has to be refined in a future research. 
• Finally, EBFP 5c (“firms with deficiencies in business administration”) has to be much more detailed because 
the current  study shows that  this  sub-pattern is  composed of  firms with different  business  administration 
problems,  which  can  lead  to  a  variety  of  financial  problems.  Under  these  conditions,  clear  relationships 
between firms belonging to this pattern and specific financial symptoms would probably only be traced after a 
further segmentation of this sub-pattern into several, more homogeneous groups of firms.
Secondly,  as the current  study does not  provide any strong relationship between each EBFP and specific financial 
symptoms, a larger research, based on a larger sample of firms, would perhaps lead to more significant results.
Thirdly, in the future, it would be interesting to concentrate on the identification of various failure paths (or failure 
trajectories), which would describe the sequence of events from the origins of the failure until N, rather than on failure 
patterns, which only focus on explanatory factors. As lots of researchers argue (Argenti, 1976; Newton, 1985), it is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  business  failure  process  is  generally  characterized  by  a  sequence  of  unfavorable 
circumstances over time. So, a firm is often weakened by some unfavorable conditions, which can be related to one of 
the five EBFP, and, then, one or several aggravating factors bring it to its knees (Argenti, 1976; Sheppard, 1994). As 
aggravating factors probably have an impact on the financial symptoms shown by distressed firms, a further study 
dedicated  to  the  identification  of  various  failure  trajectories  would  perhaps  permit  to  identify  much  stronger 
relationships between organizational and financial failure factors.
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